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Argument

1.

Trial counsel's decision to postpone the mistrial motion was not a
product of reasoned decision-making.

The State argues that Mr. Courtney's trial counsel properly chose to
postpone his mistrial motion. Underlying the State's argument is the assumption
that the postponement was the result of trial counsel's reasoned decision. But
even a cursory review of the transcript of the voir dire proceedings proves
otherwise.
After the potential juror made her tainting remark and indicated that she
would have difficulty considering Mr. Courtney innocent until proven guilty,
trial counsel offered no solutions on how to resolve the issue and reiterated
several times that he did not know how to handle the situation. (Add. C; R. 302:
39-40, 42, 43.)1
After the jury was sworn, trial counsel raised the jury tainting issue. (Id.; R.
302:60.) The district court informed trial counsel that the court had "invited a
challenge to going forward" but that a "motion was never brought or even
alluded to at the bench." (Id.; R. 302:61.) Trial counsel said that he" didn't know
at what point to make" a motion or an objection and that he thought he made

1

"Add. C" refers to Addendum C that is attached to Mr. Courtney's
opening brief.
1
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himself "pretty clear up at the bench" that he wanted to bring a motion. (Id.) But
when pressed by the district court, trial counsel admitted that he never made a
formal motion. (Id.; R. 302:62.)
Then trial counsel gave a series of justifications for his decision: he hadn't
had time to talk to his client; he wasn't paying attention while the jury was being
sworn in; he wanted jeopardy to attach; he didn't want to draw more attention to
the issue. (Id.; R. 302:62-63.) But as indicated by the district court-and discussed
more fully in Mr. Courtney's opening brief-there were plenty of times before
the jury was sworn where trial counsel could have raised the motion without
drawing undue attention from the jury, and the other reasons trial counsel gave
for not bringing the motion earlier (a misunderstanding about when jeopardy
attaches and not paying attention) constitute ineffective assistance. (See id.; R.
302:61-65.)

Trial counsel even admitted, "I didn't know where I was supposed to
make the timely- I thought it was after the jury was picked I was supposed to
make my [inaudible] Ineffective obviously." (Id.; R. 302:66.)
To argue that trial counsel's postponement of the mistrial motion was a
result of reasoned decision-making is unsupported by the record.

2
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•

2.

The law did not prohibit trial counsel from moving for a mistrial before
the jury was sworn.

The State also argues that trial counsel could not have challenged the
entire jury panel on the basis that it was tainted. The State refers to Utah R. Crim.
P. 18(c)(l)(i), which only allows a challenge to a panel based on "a material
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing,
summoning and return of the panel."
But what the State ignores is that overlaying Rule 18 is the common law of
mistrial. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have a specific rule
concerning mistrials. However, Utah has a robust common law that allows a
district court to grant a mistrial where "the circumstances are such as to
reasonably indicate . . . that a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is
necessary in order to avoid injustice." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, iJ 45, 24 P.3d 948
(quotation omitted); see Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1962) ("If
something occurs which the party thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that
he thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must make his objection promptly and

•

seek redress by moving for a mistrial .... "). No Utah case has used Rule 18 as a
limitation on when an attorney can move for a mistrial based on juror
misconduct during voir dire .

•
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In fact, taking the State's interpretation of Utah law to the extreme would
have prevented Mr. Courtney's attorney from moving for a mistrial during voir
dire if the potential juror informed the entire panel, "I know the defendant; he
sold drugs to me last week." Such a comment would clearly prejudice the
defendant and necessitate the dismissal of the entire jury panel. See Dippolito v.

State, 143 So.3d 1080, 1085-86 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a comment by a
potential juror was not harmless because of the possibility that jurors were
prejudiced by the allegation that was close to the charged crime); Tabor v.

Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (reasoning that a
potential juror's comment that she might have met the defendant at a
correctional institution was prejudicial because the panel learned about the
defendant's inadmissible conviction through voir dire); Richardson v. State, 666
So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that defendant was deprived his right
to an impartial jury when a potential juror, who informed the panel that she was
employed by a correctional institution, suggested that she knew the defendant
through her employment, implying that he was a convicted felon).
Contrary to the State's argument, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel could have
moved for a mistrial - thereby challenging the entire jury panel because of the
potential juror's comment- before the jury was sworn. And moving for a
mistrial before the jury is sworn is particularly important in criminal cases,
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where jeopardy attaches at the time a jury is sworn. State v. Manatau, 2014 UT 7,
,I 9,322 P.3d 739. 2 Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that such a motion

would have had to be done within the hearing of the jury; rather, Mr. Courtney's
attorney could have called for a sidebar at any time to address matters with the
judge outside the hearing of the jury.

3.

The district court did not address the merits of the mistrial motion.

The State argues that Mr. Courtney was not prejudiced by his counsel's
failure to bring a timely mistrial motion because the district court denied the
motion on its merits. But the district court did not address the motion on its
merits. Rather, the district court made findings about what happened but never
made a determination about whether or not Mr. Courtney was prejudiced. (Add.
C; R. 302:71.) The district court stopped short of that because it determined that
the motion was untimely. (Id.; R. 302:71-72.)
And it is not clear that the district court would have denied the mistrial
motion - if it had been made in a timely manner - given the court's clear distress
over the potential juror's comment throughout the voir dire process. (See id.; R.
302:67-68 (district court stating that a problem "was created by a juror who quite

2

The State also argues that Rule 18(c)(2) allows for a challenge to a juror for
good cause after the juror is sworn but before the evidence is presented. But it is
unclear what "good cause" would justify delaying the challenge of a jury until
after it is sworn, especially when all the facts necessary to challenge the jury are
known to the attorney well before the jury is sworn.
5
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honestly, in my opinion, ought to be bitch-slapped because ... I mean for her not
to understand the tainting that she was creating when she said that, its' s hard for
me to ... I'm just so frustrated .... "); R. 302:69 (district court stating, "That juror
should be slapped for- I mean that's an extreme statement, but it just reflects the
frustration of the Court that she would go beyond the simple question of do you
know and offer what she offered. It's so frustrating to me.")).
Finally, the State seems to argue that the potential juror could have been
identifying either Mr. Courtney or Mr. Courtney's attorney when she stated, "I
have had affiliations with him, especially during the time that I was serving as an
agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force." (Id.; R. 302:23.) But the
district court found that the potential juror "indicated that she knew Mr.
Courtney and was familiar with him from other cases." (Id.; R. 302:59.) The
record does not support the assertion that the potential juror's comment was
directed to Mr. Courtney's attorney.
As argued in the opening brief, the evidence against Mr. Courtney was not
strong. The undercover operation was focused on another drug dealer, the
confidential informant called that drug dealer before the drug exchange
occurred, and the confidential informant purchased drugs in a hotel room
registered to the drug dealer. (R. 302:95, 103, 105-107, 128.) When the
confidential informant asked Mr. Courtney if certain drugs were the informant's,
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•

Mr. Courtney said, "I don't know." (R. 302:121-22; 138.) The potential juror's
tainting comment that she had interacted with Mr. Courtney through her \,vork
on the \,Veber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force improperly tipped the scale in favor
of conviction - the comment informed the jury of past bad acts involving drugs

and allowed the jury to reason that if Mr. Courtney had been involved \•vith

drugs once, he was probably involved in this instance, also. Such a comment
should leave this Court ,vith a lack of confidence in the verdict.

DATED this 17th day of March, 2016.
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Certificate of Compliance \t\rith Rule 24(f)(1)
I hereby certify that:
1.

This brief complies ,vith the type-volume limitation of Ctah R. App.

P. 24(f)(1) because this brief contains 1,574 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(£)(1 )(B).

2.

This brief complies vdth the typeface requirements of Utah R. App.

P. 27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft \t\Tord 2010 in 13 point Book Antigua.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2016.
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mail, postage prepaid:
Tera Peterson
Utah State Attorney General's Office

Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
6 th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
The appropriate number of copies of the brief ,vere hand-delivered to the

Utah Court of Appeals.
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a

courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format ,-vas also filed with
the Court and served on A ppellee.
(_

/

•

,

,.: : '
·,

,

j

•
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

